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The history of slavery²including Native American captivity and other forms of
perpetual servitude²is now synonymous with the rise of the American economy and
inextricably linked to the history of the American Republic for historians. While this is not
a popular subject with some people, the more research that is done on the topic, the more
connections between slavery and American society at large are brought to light.
Consequently, legal histories are especially important to show the close connections
EHWZHHQ$PHULFD¶VOHJDOFXOWXUHDQGLWVIRXQGDWLRQURRWHGLQPDQ\ZD\VLQDUJXPHQWV
surrounding the enslavement of humans. The three books in this essay are welcome
additions to the literature addressing potent issues in the history of slavery from a legal
perspective in the nineteenth century and aiding our understanding of the complex,
tumultuous, and torturous relationship of American history and slavery.
The three authors choose very different ways to engage with the topic of slavery and
the law. Both Alfred Brophy in University, Court, and Slave and Paul Finkelman in
Supreme Injustice write more traditional legal histories which focus on legal actors. They
investigate lawyers, judges, and the institutions that educated them to explain a legal
culture that either did nothing to end slavery, or actively supported the interpretation of
the ConstiWXWLRQWKDWDQFKRUHGWKHSHFXOLDULQVWLWXWLRQLQWKHIDEULFRI$PHULFD¶VIRXQGLQJ
and society under the umbrella of protection of private property. The third author, William
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Kiser, adds a more ambitious point of view to the literature by investigating the clash of
several different systems of servitude and its national ramifications in the southwestern
borderlands. By focusing on the territory of New Mexico and its system of debt peonage
and Native American captivity, Kiser uses the prism of these various systems of servitude
to investigate the legal development of slavery and the challenges Southerners encountered
in defending their labor system as the sectional strife in the country built its momentum
toward civil war.
All three books connect on issues of legal thinking as Americans sought to reckon
with, and reconcile, the enslavement of African Americans with the founding ideals of the
American Republic. The three authors chosen for this essay do so on three significant
levels. Paul Finkelman picked three justices of the Supreme Court, two of them chief
justices, to show how and why each of them dealt with questions of slavery when cases
reached the highest court. Each justice believed slavery was a legal issue that had the
potential to tear apart the American Republic, but Finkelman forcefully suggests that while
they chose to act or remain silent at various stages, they could have corrected the path of
VODYHU\¶V OHJDO URDG DW PXOWLSOH MXQFWXUHV1 7KH\ GLG QRW ,QVWHDG WKH\ ³HQFRXUDJHG
southerners to attempt to create their own nation, based on the proposition that all men are
not . . . HQWLWOHGWROLIHOLEHUW\DQGWKHSXUVXLWRIKDSSLQHVV´ 2
Alfred Brophy investigates the stratum below the Supreme Court and focuses on
Southern lawyers, judges, and the law schools that educated them, to which they often
returned to teach. What Brophy concludes, and elegantly argues, is the simple fact that
Southern legal culture was entirely built on the premise that slavery was constitutional. 3
That is what law professors taught, lawyers argued, and judges ruled. This, then, had a
powerful intellectual influence on Southern leaders in the way that they engaged
constitutional questions and the way they argued with, and against, their Northern
counterparts.
:LOOLDP .LVHU¶V book, Borderlands of Slavery, operates on yet another level,
LQYHVWLJDWLQJWKHODZVRIVODYHU\DQGWKHLUPHDQLQJLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶SXVKZHVW%XW
rather than engaging in the constitutional issues that frequently whipped the Senate and
the House into a frenzy after the Mexican-American War when issues connected to slavery
and westward expansion arose, Kiser focuses on the inherent problems caused by three
very different systems of servitude that concomitantly existed in the territory of New
Mexico. He asserts that the centuries-old system of Native American captivity and the
trade of these captives, as well as the system of debt peonage, existed long before white
American settlers and army officers began to bring enslaved black people to the region.4
While this, at first glance, appears to be a regional problem, Kiser deftly shows how
national debates influenced legal proceedings in the New Mexico territory and how local
New Mexican ideas of debt peonage in turn forced Congress to wrestle with larger
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FINKELMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 24±25.
Id. at 1±2.
The two most recent biographies on John Marshall contradict Finkelman at times. See generally RICHARD
BROOKHISER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE MAN WHO MADE THE SUPREME COURT (2018); JOEL RICHARD PAUL,
WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES (2018).
9. FINKELMAN, supra note 1, at 28±31.
10. Id. at 96±102.
11. See id. at 90±100 (reviewing The Antelope case in its entirety); id. at 97±100 (addressing Marshall¶s
rejection of natural law).
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questions of perpetual servitude outside of African slavery, and even beyond the Civil War
and the Thirteenth Amendment.
When it comes to slavery and the United States Constitution, few scholars have
published as widely on the topic as Paul Finkelman, and he brings his extensive expertise
to bear in Supreme Injustice. To him, the three justices of the highest court he investigates
in this book, John Marshall, Joseph Story, and Roger Taney, were all complacent to the
spread of slavery west, if not blatantly in support of the idea. He illustrates his point by
probing the cases and opinions of the three justices, the resulting consequences for
constitutional law, and, by extension, the fate of the Union and its enslaved people. While
Finkelman concedes that the Constitution was pro-slavery, he powerfully argues that the
Supreme Court justices could still have hemmed in slavery to prevent its expansion, to
suppress the slave trade, and to protect free African Americans more substantially. 5 His
construction of the justLFHV¶MXULVSUXGHQFHEHDUVRXWKLVDUJXPHQWEXWWKHUHPD\EHPRUH
OHIWWREHVDLGRQHDFKMXVWLFH)LQNHOPDQDVFHUWDLQVWKDW³>Z@LWKYHU\IHZH[FHSWLRQVWKH
United States Supreme Court from 1801 to 1861 was a constant friend of slavery and
almost never a IULHQGRIOLEHUW\´6 +HHVVHQWLDOO\LQYRNHVWKHLGHDWKDWWKHMXVWLFHV¶PRUDOV
should have overruled the realpolitik and zeitgeist of the time, which would have made
these three justices truly independent from, and ideologically untainted by, the national
debates raging on during the Antebellum period.7 However, Finkelman absolutely
succeeds in showing how central, how foundational, slavery was to the United States and
how it dominated most facets of life.
Essentially, the book consists of three short biographies. In the first, the author takes
on John Marshall.8 He establishes that Marshall was a slave owner, and while he was
³EROGEULOOLDQWIRUFHIXODQGRIWHQIHDUOHVV´LQPRVWRIKLVMXULVSUXGHQFHDQGGHFLVLRQV
he frequently denied freedom suits. 9 )LQNHOPDQ¶VVNLOOVKLQHVZKHQKHDQDO\]HVWKHNH\
cases of John Marshall, particularly in his opinion in The Antelope,10 where he lays out
clearly how Marshall constructs his argument while rejecting natural law. He shows how
Marshall had frequently relied on natural law in other cases before and after Antelope, but
not in the case of enslaved Africans and their freedom in this case.11
7KHVHFRQGELRJUDSK\LOOXPLQDWHV-RVHSK6WRU\¶VFDUHHURQWKHKLJKHVWFRXUW0D\EH
)LQNHOPDQ¶V JUHDWHVW ZHDNQHVV OLHV LQ KLV choice of Story himself, because Finkelman
never explains adequately why he picked him as a subject. While Marshall and Taney are
self-explanatory, Story is, at first glance, an odd choice. Whereas the other two are some
RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ PRVW LQ IDPous chief justices, Story served on the court under
0DUVKDOO,QWKHDXWKRU¶VH\HV6WRU\PD\EHWKHSHUIHFWHPERGLPHQWRIWKHIRUFHVDWSOD\
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in the United States at that time. While Story appears to disapprove of the slave trade in
his opinion in Alligator,12 he then writes a much narrower opinion in the more famous
Amistad case.13 ,Q)LQNHOPDQ¶VHVWLPDWLRQWKHUHal condemning evidence for Stor\¶VSURslavery stance comes in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, ZKHUH KH ³GLG PRUH WKDQ LJQRUH
countervailing precedents; he UHZURWH WKHP WR VXSSRUW KLV RZQ RSLQLRQ´14 Finkelman
DUJXHV WKDW 6WRU\¶V UXOLQJ VHYHUHO\ threatened the freedom of many Northern African
Americans by significantly strengthening the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 15
As one would expect, Finkelman reserved his harshest²and most convincing²
SURVHFXWLRQRI³VXSUHPHLQMXVWLFH´IRU5RJHU%7DQH\+HUH)LQNHOPDQUHDOO\H[FHOV+H
is able to show that Taney, indeed, used his position on the Court to further a pro-Southern,
pro-slavery stance in the interpretation of constitutional law, culminating in the Dred Scott
decision. To Finkelman, the question that had to be answered was whether the Dred Scott
GHFLVLRQZDVDPLVWDNHRU³WKHFXOPLQDWLRQRIDFDUHHUIRFXVHGRQVXSSRUWLQJVODYHU\DQG
SHUVHFXWLQJIUHHEODFNV´16 His answer is the latter. In a slew of deft analysis, the author
GLVVHFWV 7DQH\¶V PDMRU MXULVSUXGHQFH DQG SURYHV WKDW WKH MXGJH ZDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ SURVODYHU\7RKLJKOLJKWRQHVWULQJRIDQDO\VLV)LQNHOPDQUHDVRQVWKDW7DQH\¶VGHFLVLRQVZHUH
not always based in strict constitutional interpretation.17 Rather, Taney, for example, did
QRWDOZD\VVXSSRUWVWDWHV¶ULJKWVKHRQO\GLGVRZKHQWKDWGHFLVLRQOHGWRDSUR-slavery
opinion.18 In cases where that did not appear imminent, he sided with the federal
government.19
Altogether, Finkelman builds a strong case that highlights the pervasive presence of
VODYHU\HQVODYHGSHRSOHDQGWKHLUHQVODYHUVLQ$PHULFD¶VOHJDOKLVWRU\+HDJJUHVVLYHO\
reasons that judges could have had the power to stop the institution, or at least limit its
H[SDQVLRQ <HW WKH\ GLG QRW D UHDOLW\ KH ODEHOV ³VXSUHPH LQMXVWLFH´ 20 This top down
approach to understand the importance of slavery to the legal history of the United States
has merits, but also some problems. At times, there is a lack of context to the cases and the
ZD\WKH\ZHUHDUJXHGLQIURQWRIWKHFRXUW$OIUHG%URSK\¶VUniversity, Court, and Slave
seeks to remedy that problem.
Brophy approaches the issue of slavery from a more grassroots angle. To him, the
Southern legal profession as a whole had developed an interpretation of the Constitution
that permeated all levels of the profession: all practitioners and teachers of law in the South
IHOOLQOLQH3HUWKHDXWKRU³WKHMXGJHVDQGODZ\HUVKDGOHJLWLPL]HGDZRUOGYLHZWKDWVDLG
threatV WR VODYHV DV SURSHUW\ ZDV XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG MXVWLILHG ZDU´ 21 Brophy makes
perfectly clear how the Southern symbiosis of law and culture functioned: As universities
through their teaching supported slavery, so slave labor supported schools. In a nutshell,
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On captivity, slavery, and diplomacy, see JULIANA BARR, PEACE CAME IN THE FORM OF A WOMAN:
INDIANS AND SPANIARDS IN THE TEXAS BORDERLANDS (2007); JAMES BROOKS, CAPTIVES AND COUSINS:
SLAVERY, KINSHIP, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST BORDERLANDS (2002); PEKKA HÄMÄLÄINEN, THE
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to Southerners slavery was justified by the past, it was economically necessary, and it was
perfectly moral.22 This is not necessarily a new assessment of the Southern point of view,
and the theories of, for example, Beverly Tucker, Thomas Roderick Dew, or Thomas R.
R. Cobb are well traveled ground. The first chapters very much read like an intellectual
legal history of the South but add not much new to the discussion. However, they make
meaningful connections²in particular to works such as Supreme Injustice—by situating
LWLQWKHVFKRRORI³QHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOKLVWRU\WKDWSODFHV6XSUHPH&RXUWGRFWULQHLQLWV
intellectual context and demonstrates how constitutional law in the Supreme Court and in
the minds of politicians and voters is supported by²and sometimes in turn legitimates²
LGHDVLQWKHODUJHUFXOWXUH´DQGE\IRFXVLQJRQODQGPDUNFDVHVLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKLVQHZ
direction of inquiry.23
%URSK\ZULWHVZKDWKHSUHDFKHV.H\DWOHDVWLQWKLVUHYLHZHU¶VPLQGLVWKHDXWKRU¶V
consistent ability to show how strongly institutions of higher learning in the South are
actually intertwined with the way that Southern politicians and intellectuals at large
explained the constitutionality of slavery in the Republic. Chapter three in particular
highlights the rise of a new generation of scholars and teachers in the 1830s that were
washed in the blood of the pro-slavery argument. These scholars, in turn, taught their
charges essentially how to defend slavery, and by 1857, those teachings included a turn
away from the union as a viable, constitutional option. 24 One example from an insightful
VHOHFWLRQE\WKHDXWKRULVWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI8QFOH7RP¶V&DELQ,Q%URKS\¶VDQDO\VLVWKH
book morphed into a critique of slave laws for Southerners, and an attack on slave laws
equaled an attack on Southern institutions, which in turn created a destabilization of
Southern society.25 7KHLQWHOOHFWXDOSDUWRI%URSK\¶VKLVWRU\LVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGEXWKHLV
able to show how wide these ideas permeated education, in particular legal education, in
the South and how that tainted Southern conceptions of the Constitution and the Republic.
The third book, Borderlands of Slavery: The Struggle over Captivity and Peonage
in the American Southwest by William Kiser, adds a third dimension to the legal history
of slavery. Kiser probes the New Mexico territory and its variation of servitude in
conjuncWLRQZLWK$PHULFDQZHVWZDUGH[SDQVLRQRIFKDWWHOVODYHU\.LVHU¶VERRNVKLQHVD
light on the various permutations of human bondage in the southwest and how the United
States struggled with each. The author explains the various definitions of servitude that by
the 1860s existed concomitantly in New Mexico. Two of these were based on Hispanic
legal traditions in the area conquered after the Mexican-American War. Debt peonage
forced a large group of people into essentially hereditary servitude, even though settlers in
New Mexico did not acknowledge that fact until after the Civil War. In addition, many a
servant originated in the Native American captive trade that flourished in the region and
over the centuries had become a vital part of diplomacy in the region.26

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B

03/03/2020 13:59:43

PINNEN, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

290

2/18/2020 7:52 AM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:285

KISER, supra note 4, at 68±72.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 55±56.

C M
Y K

03/03/2020 13:59:43

27.
28.
29.
30.

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B

New Mexico, according to Kiser, remained a problematic territory because of the
constant cultural, legal, and human exchange between powerful Native nations like the
Apache or Comanche and Mexico across the border to the south. In addition, the
slaveholders and abolitionists serving as territorial officials very much participated in the
rising sectional conflict in the United States. 27 Even though two systems of servitude
existed, racial slavery did not exist in the region until enslaved Atlantic Africans traveled
with their enslavers from the eastern United States, according to Kiser. Debt peonage was
so successful, and the circumstances of indebtedness so easily manipulated, that the need
never arose to develop a system of racial slavery.28 This claim needs more exploring, since
the Spanish legal tradition certainly recognized the racial inferiority of non-white people.
However, this does not hurt the overall argument of the book.
.LVHU¶VZRUNGULYHVDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHLVVXHWKDWOLQNVVODYHU\WRWKHODZof the land
in the United States. Even the systems of debt peonage and Indian captivity already in
H[LVWHQFHZHUHTXLFNO\VXFNHGLQWRDODUJHUPDUNHWHFRQRP\DQGKHQFH³>Z@KDWHYHUWKHLU
sobriquets, such systems introduced a more profit-centered form of slavery into the
6RXWKZHVW´29 This required the local enslavers to legally protect their human laborers
from outside interference. While US politicians may have not recognized debt peonage or
Indian slavery as equal to African American slavery and expresseG D ³JHQHUDO
DPELYDOHQFH´SHRSOHLQ1HZ0H[LFRGLGDQGWKHUHIRUHSDUWLFLSDWHGLQQDWLRQDOGHEDWHV
very much on the side of the South.30 Only then did politicians pay some attention to New
0H[LFR¶VFDSWLYHVDQGRQO\LQDFXUVRU\ZD\/DZPDNHUVMXGJHVDQd lawyers, based on
US law, did not recognize enslavement if people of African descent were not involved.
Legally, then, the discourse really was more concerned with African American slavery in
the context of the North-South dichotomy, rather than a true idea of liberty for all.
The three perspectives presented by the authors in this essay, taken together, offer a
fascinating view on antebellum legal culture. In particular, its connection to the institution
of slavery. All three authors build their cases on very solid ground, but their source base
varies appreciatively. From the legal elite to the legal majority and on to the legal
borderlands, we get a much clearer picture of the ways in which Southerners and
Northerners argued about the meaning of law in conjunction with the language of slavery
in the Constitution. Most importantly, all three authors impress on us the notion that the
zeitgeist of the constitutional discussion mattered, as did the historically specific moment
when discussions occurred. The best example is the problems that New Mexico faced in
joining the union. Even though politicians did not believe debt peonage and Indian
captivity could actually be classified as slavery²as they defined it clearly as not part of
the capitalist system that was African American slavery²they would not allow New
Mexico to join the union right away because of expansionist issues related to slavery. So,
while they did not acknowledge the servitude of a large population in the area as slavery,
they nevertheless agreed that New Mexico would upset the balance of non-slaveholding
and slaveholding states. Slavery dominated much of the national political²and by
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extension legal²conversation of the antebellum period and remains a defining tenant of
the development of constitutional law, American society, and the shaping of the nation in
general.

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A
03/03/2020 13:59:43

C M
Y K

